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Chapter 1: Introduction Towards a Qualified Principle of Secession 
Secession is as old as centralized control over a territory is. Reasons for secession may differ 
and, thus, so may the surrounding debate over if and why secession is justified. Although the 
issue is arguably thousands of years old there is still no clear-cut theory of secession. That is 
to say: there is no agreed upon framework in the international community as to why, how, or 
when a group may secede from any given territory to create a new state. This type of 
secession is known as classic secession.
1
 An example of such a secession is the creation of 
the United States of America when it seceded from the British Empire. The issue seems all 
the more prevalent today with recent referenda in Scotland, Catalonia and Iraqi Kurdistan 
with accompanying political turmoil in those places and continuing violent (ethnic) conflict 
in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia and many other places that are ungovernable owing to these 
conflicts. The lack of a framework for secession leaves many of these issues slumbering or 
even festering but never resolved. Can such a framework be extrapolated or constructed from 
the academic debate surrounding secession? How do we come to a formulation of justifiable 
secession?  
Philosophical and political science literature distinguish between two types of theory 
regarding the right to secede: (1) Remedial Right Only Theories, which understand secession 
as a right that a group comes to have only as a result of violations of other (basic, human) 
rights; and (2) Primary Right Theories which are primary in the sense that they do not derive 
their right to secede from the violation of other more basic rights but are inherent to the group 
that seeks secession for other reasons. Primary Right Theories are further subdivided between 
Plebiscitary Theories and Ascriptivist Theories. Plebiscitary Theories state that a unilateral 
moral right to secede exists if a majority residing in a portion of the state chooses to have 
their own state there, regardless of any common characteristics. Ascriptivist Theories state 
that a group whose members have ascriptivist characteristics, which are ascribed to 
individuals independently of their own choice, have a unilateral moral right to secede. Both 
types of Primary Right Theories do not require injustice as a necessary condition (Buchanan, 
2017).  
When accepted at face-value, Primary Right Theories could leave the world 
ungovernable with thousands of new states overnight. Accepting such a primary right would 
also create a recursive right: minorities in the newly created state through secession should 
                                                          
1
 For an exposition of other types of secession see e.g. Buchanan’s Stanford Encyclopaedia on Secession (2017). 
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have a similar right (Kofman, 1998). The 16
th
 president of the United States of America 
Abraham Lincoln went so far as to call secession ‘the essence of anarchy’, through what 
Harry Beran coined the ‘domino theory of secession’ (Beran, 1984). According to this line of 
thinking “there is no logical stopping-point short of the right of individual secession” 
(Rothbard, 1982, p. 181). In lieu of the domino theory argument, secession as a primary right 
can also be understood as an inherent violation of territorial integrity of the state from which 
a territory is seceding
2
. This territorial integrity must be respected bar any grave injustice 
which would allow secession as a remedial right (Catala, 2013). Buchanan argues that 
accepting Primary Right Theories would incentivize perverse policies such as preventing 
voting or suppressing ascriptivist characteristics even to the point of genocide. Remedial 
Right Only Theories, on the other hand, would incentivize benevolent policy in trying to 
prevent that such a remedy is necessary in the first place (Buchanan, 1997). Might such a 
remedy still be warranted, Remedial Right Only Theories provide a “valuable complement to 
the Lockean approach to the right to revolution understood as a remedial right” (Buchanan, 
1997). 
Proponents of Primary Right Theories argue that Remedial Right Only Theories are 
too restrictive. To these scholars Remedial Right Only Theories forego the liberal principles 
from which we derive our morals and values. Self-determination, which knows gradations up 
to state sovereignty, is among them (Beran, 1984). People should have the liberty to choose 
their own political association
3
 (McGee, 1992). To such scholars, Remedial Right Only 
Theories are irrelevant: the moral right to secede is inherent and requires no injustice for it to 
be exercised. Gross violations may be an impetus for secession to be sure, but the right to it 
need not be acquired. Self-determination is seen as a fundamental right and imperative to the 
well-being of a people. Wellman (2003) notes that although (political) self-determination 
must not come in the form of complete sovereignty per se (that is: in the form of a distinct, 
separate, independent state) it is imperative that there exists at least to some degree a form of 
cultural and political self-determination. This is imperative because, he reasons, “a nations 
                                                          
2
 Territorial integrity may not be violated according to international law. However, it is an “unwritten” law that 
states respect and even defend each other’s borders (see e.g. the press communiqués from the US state 
department in relation to the territorial integrity of Iraq for contemporary examples). Codified international law 
only deals with state-state relations in regards to territorial integrity (see e.g. Charter of the UN art. 2 sect. 4 and 
the first chapter of the Helsinki Final Act), whereas secession is in principle a state-subject relationship. 
3
 This is true for both ascriptivist and plebiscitarian theorists. The difference between them in this regard is that 
for plebiscitarians choosing the political association is a prima facie right, whereas for ascriptivists this is only 
true if there exists a certain ‘encompassing group’ that has ascriptivist characteristics. The democratic element is 
still necessary because otherwise the theory would force a group to secede even though a (qualified) majority of 
that group may not be in favour of secession. 
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health directly affects its member’s welfare and (...) political self-determination allows 
nations to bolster their health” (2003). In short, a nation should be able to affect its own 
welfare which it is only able to do through self-determination. This argument in turn alludes 
to the assumption that only a nation itself can affect its own welfare in the most beneficial 
way for the nation, and therefore self-determination in its most extreme form – state 
sovereignty – is the only morally justified option. The societal culture to which people are 
attached must be protected because they provide the context in which autonomy – indeed, 
self-determination – is exercised (e.g. education in one’s own language) (Moore, 2010).  
These two theoretical approaches each provide a normative framework for secession. 
Should either one be discarded in favour of the other or can they complement each other? 
This thesis will look at both these theoretical approaches and attempt to arrive at a qualified 
principle of secession. The central research question is as follows: should a plausible political 
theoretical approach to the issue of secession be based on the primary rights theory, the 
remedial rights only theory, or a combination of both? In order to properly answer this 
question, I have formulated four sub-questions. First: what does it mean to secede? (Chapter 
2) This question will lay the groundwork for understanding the debate within and between the 
two main theoretical approaches. It does so by explicating who secedes and why, as these are 
elements essential to any political theory on secession. Second: under what conditions is 
secession justified according to Remedial Right Only Theories? (Chapter 3) This will provide 
an adequate framework to determine when secession may take place according to these 
theories. Third: under what conditions is secession justified according to Primary Right 
Theories? (Chapter 4) This question will in turn provide an adequate framework to determine 
when secession may take place according to Primary Right Theories. Fourth: what are the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of these theoretical approaches? (Chapter 5) This question 
will provide a debate between the two theoretical approaches which will ultimately allow for 
a concluding chapter discussing the central research question (Chapter 6).  
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Chapter 2: What Does It Mean to Secede? 
This chapter will lay the groundwork for a debate on a principle of secession, the relevant 
theories and theoretical framework. It does so by developing a clear understanding of what it 
means to secede by touching upon what secedes, who, and why. As noted in the introductory 
chapter, this thesis will deal with the classic type of secession: the attempt to create a new 
state, leaving behind the original state in a reduced form. The debate on secession rooted in 
political theory is normative: under what conditions is secession justified? Secession 
inherently violates the territorial integrity of the state from which is being seceded. This 
reveals two questions: (1) Who is it that secedes?; and (2) How can secession be reconciled 
with the principle of territorial integrity? With classic secession there exists a motivation to 
separate from the state. The ‘who’ that is pursuing secession apparently has a feeling of 
‘otherness’ from ‘the rest’ which it is seeking to leave behind. To find an answer to the first 
question, then, it is impossible not to touch upon an oft-cited reason on why secession takes 
place. 
The Charter of the United Nations speaks in its first article about the “principles of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples” (article 1, section 2). Self-determination is 
seen as a fundamental right and imperative to the well-being of a people (Wellman, 2003). 
However, as Wellman (2003) states, political and cultural self-determination can take other 
forms than complete sovereignty – but sometimes this is not enough. Secession is thus 
pursued in light of self-determination. A nation wants to control their own destiny, whether 
this is due to political, economic, cultural, historical reasons, or a combination of these 
motivations. 
So what constitutes a people or a nation? In their seminal piece National Self-
Determination Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz (1990) go through a step by step analysis by 
which a nation – and thus a distinct peoples (or as Margalit and Raz coined it: an 
‘encompassing group’) – may be identified. A nation or peoples is first and foremost a group. 
The group should have certain traits: 1. “The group has a common character and a common 
culture (...) and their identity is determined at least in part by their culture”; 2. “[People] 
growing up among members of the group will acquire the group culture”; 3. “Membership of 
the group is a matter of mutual recognition”; 4. The membership of the group is important for 
one’s self-identification; 5. Membership of the group is not a matter of choice or 
achievement, but determined by “nonvoluntary [sic] criteria”; 6. The groups concerned are 
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“anonymous groups where mutual recognition is secured by the possession of general 
characteristics” (Margalit & Raz, 1990, pp. 443-447). The who that is pursuing secession then 
becomes more clear. It is not a small group of people that one day decide that they want to 
leave the ‘parent-state’. They are a distinct group which have commonalities between each 
other, who recognize each other as part of this group without having to know one another on 
a personal level. Moreover, the membership of this group is involuntary. The distinctiveness 
of the group hints at a division: an “us” and a “them”. Within any single state dealing with 
issues of secession there are thus at least two distinct peoples or nations.  
From this flow forth new questions. When a state holds more than one distinct nation, 
why should self-determination issues not be resolved in the political arena? Why should 
secession be the course of action? And how would this be reconciled with the principle of 
territorial integrity? Why secession should be the course of action for an encompassing group 
is best answered through the two main theoretical approaches: this is a right that is acquired 
and should be exercised to remedy a bad situation (for the Remedial Right Only theorists) or 
this is a primary right which can be exercised for any number of reasons (for the Primary 
Right theorists). An elaboration on these justifications will be provided in chapters 3 and 4 
respectively. The reconciliation of secession with territorial integrity rests in large part on the 
question of whose territory the territory in question is. Brilmayer (1991) states that a 
persuasive separatist argument must present a valid territorial claim. The seeming conflict of 
principles – that of self-determination and territorial integrity – does not exist according to 
Brilmayer, because the conflict is over land. In other words: “defining government in terms 
of land better explains what secessionists are trying to accomplish” (Brilmayer, 1991). A 
territorial claim lies at the heart of secession, not mere self-determination.  
In sum, classic secession pertains to a territorial claim by a group who, for whatever 
reason, pursue this claim with the goal of becoming a sovereign state in their own right – 
separating this territory from the original state. The following two chapters will provide an 
overview of the two main theoretical approaches for a principle of secession. These will each 
provide an answer to the questions of why and when secession should be possible. As noted 
above, self-determination is an oft-cited reason for secession. However, as we shall see, for at 
least one of the two main theoretical approaches this is not sufficient justification for a 
principle of secession. 
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Chapter 3: Under What Conditions is Secession Justified According 
to Remedial Right Only Theories? 
This chapter will identify under what conditions secession may be justified according to 
Remedial Right Only Theories by looking at the most prominent contributions to this 
approach. First it will provide the basic blueprint for this type of theory. Then it will justify 
the territorial claims that may arise according to these theories. Additional criteria will then 
be provided along with the arguments to why these should be necessary. Finally the chapter 
will conclude by summarizing secession as a remedial right and touch upon the difference 
between the most important scholars within this approach.  
Remedial Right Only Theories understand secession as a right that a group comes to 
have only as a result of violations of other, more basic rights. Secession is seen as a remedy 
for these violations as it provides the group which has had their rights violated with a state of 
their own and, in theory, an escape from these violations. Allen Buchanan (2017) identifies 
two types of violations which would grant such a remedial right: (1) The reclamation of a 
territory which was unjustly taken; and (2) Acquiring a claim over a territory as a result of 
“serious and persistent violations of basic human rights (...) or unilateral revocation of 
intrastate autonomy agreements”. These two types of injustice give rise to a right to secede 
for Remedial Right Only Theories. A prima facie right to secede does not exist but requires 
grave injustice as mentioned here. A major strength of this type of approach to secession is 
thus that it is constraining on unilateral secession by recognizing the gravity of “non-
consensual state-breaking” which requires “a weighty justification” (Buchanan, 2017). 
The formulation of these violations reveal that for Remedial Right Only theorists a 
(persistent) violation of basic human rights is not solely sufficient for the acquisition of the 
right to secede. Indeed, the right is acquired after territory is unjustly taken or a claim over a 
territory is established owing to other violations. A claim to secession must then also provide 
a proper justification for a claim to a particular territory. As noted, reclamation of unjustly 
taken territory can be one such justification. However, how far back in history should this 
type of justification be accepted as justified? The right of secession cannot be acceded to just 
any historical political unit. For instance, if we were to accede the right so liberally any of the 
former smaller kingdoms that were unified into France through conquests spanning the late 
5
th
 until early 9
th
 Centuries – most of whom have no traced lineage into the present day – 
would have such a right. Applying reclamation of unjustly taken territory in such a broad 
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manner is deeply problematic for a variety of reasons, perhaps the most important of which is 
that people would simply not want to live in one of these smaller kingdoms when they have 
been an integral part of France for centuries. 
Lea Brilmayer (1991) provides an answer to this type of problem for a claim to 
territory. She identifies two main factors in relation to the justification of territorial claims: 
(1) A historical grievance (e.g. colonial domination, unlawful annexation etc.); and (2) The 
continuing role of ethnicity within this historical grievance (Brilmayer, 1991). This means 
that in order to have a justified territorial claim a people should have come under the 
dominion of another state “by way of some unjustifiable historic event” and this grievance is 
still salient at the time of the claim (Brilmayer, 1991). In other words: the grievance the 
people have owing to this “unjustifiable historic event” continues to matter to both the 
distinctiveness of their ethnicity and their claim to the territory in question. To Brilmayer 
then, it is always a form of reclamation of territory. By adding the requirement of continued 
salience of ethnicity to the historical grievance she significantly limits this type of claim. In 
this way the conquest in the early 6
th
 Century by Clovis of the Visigoths ruling over the south 
of France can still be deemed an unjustifiable historic event. The continuing role of the 
Visigoth ethnicity in relation to this historical grievance, however, simply does not exist. The 
lack of salience of the encompassing group identity – in this example that of the Visigoths – 
denies them the territorial claim. It is important to emphasize that this historical grievance is 
tied to a specific territory, that secession indeed pertains a specific territorial claim that 
requires justification. Only an encompassing group historically tied to a compact territory – 
that is to say a contiguous territory or ‘un-dotted spread’ of the populace in question – may 
possibly opt for secession. The fact that the territory in question should be compact is 
important in two ways: to allow for the possibility of secession from the parent state in the 
first place (the territory should be demarcated) and second to be able to fulfil the ‘state 
viability requirement’, which is the requirement that “[both] the seceding unit and the 
remainder state must be able adequately to perform the basic functions that justify legitimize 
states in the first place” (Buchanan, 2017). Brilmayer (1991) uses the example of diasporas to 
make the importance of the historical ties explicit: if the territorial claim is disconnected from 
the historical grievance we should accept a territorial claim by, exempli gratia, the Turkish 
diaspora in Germany (if their basic human rights were proven to be persistently violated). 
Despite this diaspora being a distinct peoples they should have no claim over any German 
territory even if they are geographically concentrated and have their rights violated because 
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they have no historical ties to any such territory. In short: the status as a people (i.e. a group 
defined as such) – whose rights may or may not be violated – is insufficient for a valid 
territorial claim (Brilmayer, 1991).  
Buchanan (1997) expands that the acquisition of a claim to a territory as a result of 
violations of basic human rights or the infringement on intrastate autonomy agreements 
comes with a certain set of responsibilities. These include (but should not be limited to): the 
protection of minority and human rights in the newly created state, a fair division of national 
debt, a negotiated determination of new boundaries, arrangements for the continuation, 
renegotiation or termination of treaty obligations, and provisions for defense and security 
(Buchanan, 1997). These are fairly practical matters, straight-forward issues which do not 
require further comment except for the important implication: in justified secession, it is not 
only the seceding party that should be taken into consideration but also those affected by their 
secession (i.e. the people in and territory of the remainder state). Justice for one group should 
not lead to the injustice of another. In extrapolating this to any concrete international legal 
right to secede, Buchanan (1997) elaborates that there are additional criteria for evaluating 
proposals for such a right. These can be summed up in four criteria: (1) Minimal Realism: the 
proposal must be progressive in better serving basic values than the status quo and be 
minimally realistic in having significant prospect of being implemented through the processes 
by which international law is made; (2) Consistency with well-entrenched principles: a new 
principle of secession should not come at the price of calling into question a well-entrenched, 
morally progressive principle in international law but be able to exist beside them or build on 
them; (3) Absence of perverse incentives: any international legal principle concerning 
secession should not encourage groups pursuing secession – or those seeking to prevent it – 
to engage in perverse policies (e.g. discriminatory development policies, repressive 
immigration policies, ethnic cleansing etc.); and (4) Moral accessibility: the proposal should 
incorporate ethical principles and arguments that have broad cross-cultural appeal and 
motivational power whose cogency is already acknowledged within well-established, morally 
sound principles of international law (Buchanan, 1997). In short: any proposal on secession 
should build upon the already existing framework of international law and institutions. 
Amandine Catala (2013) too recognizes that basic rights violations coupled with a legitimate 
territorial claim does not automatically lead to a right of secession. With what she calls “the 
moral permissibility” [of a group’s secession and the validity of its territorial claim], not only 
should the state which a group is seeking to leave lack political legitimacy for this group but 
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the newly established state should indeed have it (Catala, 2013). She understands political 
legitimacy specifically as the provision of justice in the sense of adequate protection of 
human, territorial, autonomy and voting rights (Catala, 2013). This is of course at the heart of 
any Remedial Right Only Theory – (the remedy to) gross violations. However, the important 
implication is that any newly established state should in turn be able to provide adequate 
protection – and indeed so should the ‘remnant state’ which is left behind. If a theory would 
not have any such requirement secession would have no logical stopping point bar any 
‘encompassing group requirements’. The additional criteria forwarded by Buchanan (1997) 
and Catala (2013) serve to qualify a principle of secession in both institutional terms and in 
terms of morals and rights. 
Any acceptable principle of secession for Remedial Right Only theorists goes beyond 
violations of fundamental rights or intrastate agreements. There should still exist an 
encompassing group who not only have a grievance but are also historically tied to the 
territory in question. Moreover the ethnicity – at least to Brilmayer (1991) – should not have 
lost its salience throughout history. To Buchanan (1997) the ethnicity requirement is not 
explicit. However, he acknowledges that in practice “the groups that suffer persistent grave 
injustices are in fact nations” (Buchanan, 2017). With it he acknowledges the practical 
relevance of ethnic identity but to Buchanan this does not seem to be a moral requirement. 
Buchanan (1997) does, however, explicitly agree with the justification for secession if 
previously sovereign territory was unjustly taken. The distinction between the two 
predominant scholars for this theoretical approach then is that Brilmayer (1991) sees ethnicity 
as a requirement whereas Buchanan sees group identity in the form of having been part of the 
same political unit as a requirement. It seems, then, that for Brilmayer ethnic nationalism is 
required (i.e. group membership is hereditary) where for Buchanan civic nationalism is 
required (i.e. group membership may be acquired through a type of social contract – 
becoming a participating citizen of the state). Although this difference in approach may have 
serious theoretical and practical implications, the writers do not engage on this point. It is 
therefore unclear whether this difference is unintended and they may in fact agree on either 
requirement or that it is deliberate. It seems, however, that it is unintended as both scholars 
tend to elaborate on such matters when it is relevant to theory.  
When sufficient (degrees or persistency of) violations are observed and the territorial 
claim can be justified secession does not automatically follow for these theorists. The new 
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state and any remnant state must both be able to provide adequate protection. Any principle 
of secession should also take into account certain practical and legal matters such as the 
upholding of treaties and debt obligations for which the former state as a whole was 
responsible. Moreover, it should not upset the established international legal and institutional 
order but build on them. The remedial right should be morally progressive, accessible and not 
encourage any perverse policies by any group or state seeking to secede or prevent another 
from doing so. 
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Chapter 4: Under What Conditions is Secession Justified According to 
Primary Right Theories? 
Primary Right Theories are primary in the sense that they do not derive their right to secede 
from the violation of other more basic rights. For these theories, the right to secede is inherent 
to the group that seeks secession for any number of reasons. Primary Right Theories are 
subdivided between Plebiscitary Theories and Ascriptivist Theories. Plebiscitary Theories 
state that a unilateral moral right to secede exists if a majority residing in a portion of the 
state chooses to have their own state there, regardless of any common characteristics (in other 
words: it does not require a nation!). Ascriptivist Theories state that a group whose members 
have ascriptivist characteristics, which are ascribed to individuals independently of their own 
choice, have a unilateral moral right to secede (conversely, thus, this type of theory states that 
every nation has a right to unilateral secession).  
As noted in footnote 3, is necessary for both plebiscitary and ascriptivist theories that 
a democratic vote takes place before seceding. If this vote did not take place it would 
theoretically force secession on a peoples that may not want it in the first place. However, 
within Plebiscitary Theories this right to vote for secession is a prima facie right, whereas for 
Ascriptivist Theories this requires first the existence of an encompassing group. Groups 
pursuing secession for whatever reason are necessarily concentrated within a specific 
territory for secession to be even possible. If this is not the case any political party could call 
for secession by its voters who are scattered over an entire country
4
. Every individual who 
voted for this political party would become part of the new political entity which, owing to its 
spread, would never be viable as such – something which all scholars see as a requirement for 
any new state as a result of secession (see e.g. (Beran, 1993; Birch, 1984; Buchanan, 2017; 
Catala, 2013; Copp, 1998; Philpott, 1995; Wellman, 1995)). Thus for Primary Right theorists 
secession also concerns a particular territory. However, it does not require any historical 
grievance or violation of rights or agreements for the right to secession to be acquired; this 
right is always there. But then what do Primary Right theorists view as necessary for this 
right to be exercised?  
                                                          
4
 Moreover, this would seriously undermine any (representative) democracy as it would allow for any party to 
opt out when they disagree with the political course (Birch, 1984). It “undermine[s] the democratic exchange of 
ideas” and “threaten[s] the pluralist and multifaceted character of contemporary democracy” (Moore, 2000, p. 
236). 
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For plebiscitarian theorists this question is almost irrelevant. This right is inherent 
and, ergo, precludes no requirements other than the mere wish to secede. The right logically 
flows forth from the liberal principles which demands the autonomy of self – or at the very 
least the freedom to exercise this autonomy – and therewith the freedom to choose one’s own 
political association (McGee, 1992; Philpott, 1995; Wellman, 1995). However, as we have 
seen secession necessarily pertains to a demarcated territory which should be a viable 
political entity, or as Allan Buchanan (2017) coined it, the new state should fulfil “the state 
viability requirement”. This, then, however recognizing individual liberty, negates the 
domino theory of secession wherein potentially every individual may secede
5
. 
The previous question should thus be rephrased: how do primary right theorists define 
and justify a claim to territory? Where remedial right only theorists are fairly uniform in their 
theorizing
6
 this is not the case for primary right theorists. In a defense of the plebiscitarian 
idea of a primary right, Wellman posits that “any group that is able and willing to perform the 
functions required of a liberal political state has a claim to the territory it occupies”  if the 
exercising of the right to self-determination “will not leave the remainder state in a condition 
that it has a right not to experience” (1995, p. 164). This is analogous to the state viability 
requirement forwarded by all theorists. However, as noted above, the claim is necessarily 
made by a group of people residing in a particular territory. If the claim to territory is only 
qualified by the state viability requirement the question becomes who gets to make this claim. 
To Wellman (1995), these are simply the residents of the territory in question
7
. To most 
others, group requirements are more elaborate. Defining such a group, however, is the bane 
of all primary right theorists.  
Beran (1993) takes issue with the conception of encompassing groups as proposed by 
Margalit and Raz (1990) in correctly observing that this conception inherently involves 
conflict. One encompassing group may be subsumed by another. As an example Beran 
(1993) sketches a clash between the encompassing group of the British identity – which 
                                                          
5
 In a utopian bout, Robert W. McGee seems to be the only author that sees no problem with this degree of 
individual liberty although he admits “there may be some technical difficulties” (McGee, 1992, p. 66). 
6
 This uniformity is evidenced by the lack of diversity in scholars and thought. This type of theory hinges mostly 
on the works of Buchanan and the seminal work on territorial interpretation by Brilmayer, which are cited time 
and again. 
7
 Wellman later acknowledged the importance of nations in relation to self-determination and secession but 
oddly concluded that it does not automatically follow that “each nation has a right to its own state” (Wellman, 
2003, p. 278). Although raising interesting points, at this point in his writing it is unclear what Wellman actually 
desires from political theory. He still seems to be in favour of self-determination but does not make explicit 
when or why this should be possible. 
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includes the Scots – with that of the Scots which is an encompassing group in and of itself. 
He concludes that therefore only nations should have the right to self-determination. To 
Beran, nations are “not to be defined by affinities of language or a common historical origin, 
though these things often help produce a nation (...) What constitutes a nation (...) is a 
sentiment of similarity and an instinct of belonging to the same group or herd” (1993, p. 481). 
This definition in itself does not yet clash with the encompassing group as defined by 
Margalit and Raz but Beran expands by positing what he calls “a voluntaristic doctrine of the 
right of self-determination” which circumvents the ambiguity of the concept of a ‘nation’. 
According to this doctrine the right to self-determination exists for any group which “(1) has 
awareness of itself as a distinct group, (2) is the majority in a territory, and (3) is viable as an 
independent political entity” (Beran, 1993, p. 484). It then becomes important which identity 
takes precedence. The Scots are the majority in Scotland but so are, automatically, the British 
because Scots are also British. How they define themselves first and foremost is then relevant 
to the question of self-determination: are you first a Scot or do you identify first as British? 
This helps to make more clear who has the right to self-determination. It is important to insert 
a quote from Daniel Philpott here in order to have a complete understanding of the primary 
right to secede from the plebiscitarian perspective. A plebiscitary is always required for a 
qualified principle of secession but so far there has been no mention on who should get to 
vote. To Philpott self-determination in the form of secession is qualified by the injustice 
inflicted on the larger state and with it he shows, like many other scholars, that when trying to 
come to a qualified principle on secession not only the seceding territory and peoples should 
be taken into account. However, the remainder state and peoples ought not be able to 
participate in the plebiscitary: “Allowing this would be like allowing the English to vote on 
the independence of the American colonies, the Iraqi Sunnis to decide the fate of Iraqi Kurds 
or Shiites, or the Soviet Union that of the Lithuanians” (Philpott, 1995, p. 363). Indeed, “[the] 
right to decide whether another self can enjoy self-determination would make a mockery of 
the concept” (Philpott, 1995, p. 363). 
For plebiscitarian theorists the right to (a vote on) secession can be acceded to groups 
who fulfil the three criteria described above as forwarded by Beran (1993). For ascriptivist 
theorists using the concept of encompassing groups by Margalit and Raz (1990) is one way to 
define a group which would have such a primary right. However as shown, this concept is not 
without problems. In the ascriptivist camp, Margaret Moore (1997) has forwarded a 
subjective definition of nation, deferring from this problem and automatically assigning 
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territory through her proposal. To her, the first addendum of Beran’s criteria as quoted in the 
previous paragraph for secession is leading: “If (...) Tibetans express a desire for self-
determination, we do not ask what characteristics make them (...) Tibetans. This is a matter 
for scholars of (...) Asian cultures” (Moore, 1997, p. 905). Objectively defined or described 
characteristics may be defined on a case by case basis. Many ‘objective characteristics’ 
overlap between nations. Think for instance of all the Spanish speaking peoples in the world. 
No scholar, politician or policy maker would dare to lump them together. Moore (1997) 
posits further that not only does this subjective definition of nations circumvent “the problem 
of specifying objective criteria” but it also helps “resolving the problem of specifying a 
jurisdictional unit [for the plebiscite on secession]” (Moore, 1997, p. 905). The logic of the 
possibility of recursive secession along with the requirement for a majority helps in 
demarcating the territory of the concentrated subjectively defined group: any self-defined 
nation who pursues secession would make sure that the plebiscitary is held within a territory 
where they have the required majority. The criticism that this may aggrieve many individuals 
is a moot point to Moore (1997) as some dissatisfaction is inherent in any democratic 
decision. She sketches the satisficing example of a situation where in the status quo 60% of 
the population is happy and 40% unhappy but by redrawing the boundaries this may shift to 
85% of the population being happy and only 15% being unhappy. This would indeed be 
“morally and practically relevant” (Moore, 1997, p. 910). 
Within Primary Right Theories secession is thus justified when there exists a distinct 
group who are aware that they are a distinct group – which should be subjectively defined 
according to both Plebiscitary and Ascriptivist Theories – and is concentrated within the 
territory in question where they are the majority. This group should have the will and ability 
to properly govern this territory. Not only must they themselves fulfil the state viability 
requirement but the remainder state should also still be a viable political entity. A plebiscitary 
is necessary to prevent enforcing secession on a group that does not wish it as it is not 
unthinkable that a group, rightly so or not, is convinced that they are better off in the larger 
encompassing group – as was the case with the 2014 vote on Scottish independence. This 
plebiscitary should only be accessible to the people within the territory that is seeking 
secession, because although the remainder state and its people are heavily affected by 
secession of any of its territories, allowing them to decide on another’s self-determination is 
an annexation accompli.  
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Chapter 5: What Are the Relative Strengths and Weaknesses of the 
Primary Right and Remedial Right Only Theoretical Approaches? 
Having described the two theoretical approaches it is now possible to look at the strengths 
and weaknesses of each of these types of theory. This chapter will first describe the pros of 
Primary Right Theories and the cons of Remedial Right Only Theories (i.e. the viewpoint of 
Primary Right Theory proponents). It will then review the pros of Remedial Right Only 
Theories and the cons of Primary Right Theories (i.e. the viewpoint of Remedial Right Only 
Theory proponents). 
The main attraction of Primary Right Theories is that it allows all subjectively defined 
groups to opt for self-determination to the point of state sovereignty, provided that all the new 
states and the former states in reduced form can still fulfil the state viability requirement. 
According to plebiscitarians the principles of liberalism demand the possibility of choosing 
our own political association (McGee, 1992; Philpott, 1995; Wellman, 1995). This would 
also allow for a democratic path to redrawing boundaries (Buchanan, 2017). For 
plebiscitarians, then, their theories allow for a democratic, non-violent liberal way of 
(re)drawing a map of the world. For ascriptivists full sovereignty may not be needed per se in 
order for a nation to “bolster their [own] health” (Wellman, 2003)8, but this does not mean 
that they should not be allowed to have their own state. As Daniel Kofman (1998) points out, 
groups and indeed nations are not static. They are in flux and evolve, and the acquisition of 
independence is a next step in the evolution of identity (Kofman, 1998). Ascriptivists not 
only see it as a liberal moral imperative that a primary right of secession should exist because 
of the right to self-determination by nations, but also as an integral part of the evolutionary 
dynamism of identity. 
Primary Right Theories, then, are quite inclusive in acceding a right to secession. 
Conversely, Remedial Right Only Theories are not which is why Primary Right theorists take 
issue with secession just as a remedial right. Remedial Right Only Theories largely ignore 
liberal principles and demand not only grave injustice but additional requirements such as 
historical grievances due to colonialism or annexation. For Primary Right theorists the right 
to secede as a remedial right is so stringent that it has hardly any practical relevance by 
ignoring other morally sound justifications rooted in liberal principles such as freedom (of 
                                                          
8
 Wellman has by this time in his writing acknowledged the importance of nations for secession. 
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choice), sovereignty – or self-determination – and majority rule (Beran, 1984). This is 
problematic for many peoples in the Middle East and Africa who would want their own state 
ideally, but have neither been annexed nor are they under the yolk of colonialism (anymore). 
The concept of political organization in the form of statehood has been pushed onto them in 
the colonial era which results in conflicting encompassing groups: the Kurds in Iraq are 
Iraqis, but Iraqis are not Kurds per se. The issue for Primary Right theorists vis-à-vis 
Remedial Right Only theorists is that they reduce the right to secede so significantly that it 
becomes virtually unattainable, which is a moral deficiency as there are plenty of other moral 
justifications that ought to accede a right to secede (Beran, 1984; Copp, 1998; Moore, 2010; 
Philpott, 1995; Wellman, 1995; Wellman, 2003). 
Remedial Right Only theorists in turn see this exactly as the strength of their theories. 
The right to secede should be restrictive not only because the amount of nations is larger than 
the amount of possible viable states (Buchanan, 1991), but also because it would create many 
new minorities who would be vulnerable to perverse policies (Buchanan, 1997). Viewing 
secession as a remedial right would create an incentive for benevolent policy making in trying 
to prevent that secession as a remedy would be necessary in the first place (Buchanan, 1997). 
According to this line of thinking, states would treat their nations and territories well so that 
the need to secede does not arise. All human rights, intrastate agreements and minorities 
would be respected as to not give rise to a (perceived) necessity for secession to remedy any 
abuse. 
This automatically becomes a critique on Primary Right Theories. Because the right is 
primary for those theories they would encourage states to employ malevolent policies in 
preventing voting from occurring or ascriptivist characteristics from becoming evident even 
to the point of genocide – to prevent this primary right from being exercised (Buchanan, 
1997). Moreover, for Remedial Right Only theorists it is ambiguous how the boundaries for 
any secession should be defined and morally justified through Plebiscitary Theories 
(Brilmayer, 1991; Buchanan, 2017). This democratic boundary problem alludes to the 
ambiguity of who gets to vote for what territory. Furthermore, anyone disagreeing with the 
occurring secession but included in the new state owing to the loss of the vote could in turn, 
according to the plebiscitary theories, hold a plebiscitary on yet a new secession. This creates 
a recursive right for secession (Kofman, 1998) which would have no logical stopping point 
short of individual secession (Rothbard, 1982). If the primary right should be based on 
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ascriptivist characteristics it is unclear what they should be to Remedial Right Only theorists. 
Not only lies the difficulty in the meaning of “peoples”, but ascribed criteria such as language 
– what counts as dialect of the same language and what counts as a distinct language – each 
have their own difficulties (Buchanan, 1991). 
Both types of theory are shown to have very fundamental pros and cons. However, the 
disagreement between the two theoretical approaches to secession does not seem to be 
grounded in any disagreements over morality. Rather, for Remedial Right Only theorists it is 
the ambiguity of who could have a primary right to secede of what territory as well as the 
unfeasibility of such a right owing to its scope (of groups that should have such a right) and 
overlap (in territories claimed by more than one group). In addition, “the idea of the 
ethnically exclusive state is an incitement to ethnic cleansing” (Buchanan, 2017). Primary 
Right theorists lament that Remedial Right Only Theories deny freedoms that are rooted in 
liberalist principles such as the freedom to choose one’s own political association (Beran, 
1984; Philpott, 1995; Wellman, 1995) or the right to national self-determination (Moore, 
1997). Having interpreted each type of theory and their strengths and weaknesses, it should 
now be possible to qualify them and conclude this thesis. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
As concluded in the previous chapter, the disagreement between the approaches of Remedial 
Right Only Theories and Primary Right Theories do not seem to be grounded in morality. 
This chapter will summarize and review previous observations, scholars and their arguments. 
In bringing them together it will be possible to conclude this thesis by answering the central 
research question: 
Should a Plausible Theoretical Approach to the Issue of Secession be Based on the Primary 
Rights Theory, the Remedial Rights Only Theory, or a Combination of Both? 
Kofman (1998) points out that group identities are not static and state sovereignty 
may be a next evolutionary step. Buchanan (1991) too recognizes identity dynamism but 
through it he sees a problem to objectively define any group which should have a primary 
right to secede. With it he does not deny the moral justification for the primary right, but 
stipulates a practical impossibility. However, as we have seen this may be solved through 
subjective definitions. Both the plebiscitary and ascriptivist type of Primary Right Theories 
have proposed such solutions (Beran, 1984; Moore, 1997). Moreover, Buchanan even admits 
the significance of self-determination (Catala, 2013, pp. 78-81). Brilmayer (1991) too sees 
group identity as a requirement. However she and Buchanan take issue with the demarcation 
of territory and solve this through their perpetrated injustice requirements in the form of 
historical grievances (such as colonialism and annexation) or the gross violation of (basic, 
human, intrastate-autonomy) rights (Brilmayer, 1991; Buchanan, 1997). The moral 
permissibility of a group’s secession are thus rooted in what Catala (2013) summed up as 
political legitimacy (i.e. the “parent state”, owing to reasons such as annexation or 
colonialism, is illegitimate) and adequate protection (the safeguarding of human, territorial, 
autonomy and voting rights). This moral justification to a claim to territory, however, is not 
an attack on any moral justifications within Primary Right Theories. Rather, it is again a 
solution for remedial right proponents in solving their perceived problem of defining the 
territory which may secede. But this too is solved through the subjective definitions of both 
Primary Right Theory approaches.  
The argument that ethnically exclusive states may result in perverse policy vis-à-vis 
minorities seems to be a serious danger. However, not only does this objection assume that 
suppressing or otherwise disadvantaging minorities will be the modus operandi, it completely 
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ignores already established rules and norms altogether (e.g. those of human rights). Consider 
that an army can be used to execute genocidal policies. This does not mean that it will be 
used as such. The fact that it can be used as such does not automatically mean no state should 
be allowed to have an army. This, then, is a failure of practice, but not of theory. This does 
not mean that political theory may not demand – and indeed should demand – that minority 
or human rights should be respected in any new state after secession. But their violation does 
not automatically flow forth from secession. Empirically, in fact, it is not secession that 
causes such gross violations but rather the prevention of secession (Kofman, 1998).  
The critique by remedial right theorists that the world would become ungovernable if 
a primary right to secession were to be acceded is also very tentative. The critique builds on 
the assumption that all nations or groups desiring so will come to have such a right leaving 
the world with legions of states that would not be able to perform state functions (Buchanan, 
1997). However, this ignores the acknowledgement by Primary Right theorists that any new 
or remainder state after secession should still be able to fulfil the so-called state viability 
requirement (Beran, 1993; Birch, 1984; Copp, 1998; Philpott, 1995; Wellman, 1995). 
Furthermore, the demand that any group or nation should be territorially concentrated 
circumvents any overlapping claims to territory (Moore, 1997).  
The only moral objection to any primary right to secede that remains standing is 
aimed at Plebiscitary Theories and actually comes from within the Primary Right Theories 
camp. Birch (1984) claims that if there is a right of voice, there should be no right of exit. 
That is: if the group in question is not barred from political participation it should not have 
the right to secede. But as Beran correctly observes, sometimes a group may never have the 
chance to become the majority and deal with “unbridgeable differences” (Beran, 1984, p. 27). 
If the group is territorially concentrated it should then be allowed to secede (Beran, 1984; 
Copp, 1998; Wellman, 1995). However, as touched upon in footnote four, this seriously 
undermines democracy. Ideologically similar groups would “simply set up their own self-
governing states” if they did not get their way through the ballot box, “undermine the 
democratic exchange of ideas and (...) thereby threaten the pluralist and multifaceted 
character of contemporary democracy” (Moore, 2000, p. 236). Allowing such a primary right 
under Plebiscitary Theories would remove the need for political participation for territorially 
concentrated groups. Ironically, Plebiscitary Theories then undermine the exact liberal, 
democratic principles in which they are rooted and which they claim to propagate, and would 
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theoretically create ideologically monotonous units
9
. It could also be argued that any 
ascriptivist group could undermine democracy in a similar way through (the threat of) 
secession if they did not get what they want in the political arena. However, this would not be 
based on non-ascriptivist group traits, but merely ascriptivist ones and in fact not obstruct any 
democratic exchange of ideas; it would only alter the arena within which this exchange would 
take place and not actually halt this exchange altogether. 
The issue Primary Right theorists take with secession as a remedial right seems to 
have no moral rebuttal. Although it may be argued that Remedial Right Theories are still 
rooted in liberal principles, they ignore other liberal principles. This is a moral deficiency 
which is only defended with the arguments that allowing such a liberal application of the 
right to secede – indeed as a primary right – would result in an ungovernable world owing to 
the non-viability of the resulting states (Buchanan, 1991), creating incentives for perverse 
policies (Buchanan, 1997) and that any wider scope such as Primary Right theorists propose 
would result in unsolvable ambiguities (Brilmayer, 1991; Buchanan, 2017). However, none 
of these arguments seem to hold if Catala’s (2013) “adequate protection” addendum is added, 
the state viability requirement is indeed required by Primary Right Theories – which it is – 
and the subjective definitions as proposed by Beran (1993) and Moore (1997) are accepted. 
Considering all these stances, Plebiscitary Theories have to be set aside if plurality in 
democracy is deemed a greater moral good than the option for any one group to hold a 
plebiscitary for secession. If this argument by Birch (1984) and elaborated by Moore (2000) 
is shown to be morally irrelevant – which to me it has not yet been – there is no objection to 
why this type of theory should not be accepted. Ascriptivist Theories hold firm accepting the 
subjective definition of nations as proposed by Moore (1997). Adequate protection, political 
legitimacy and the state viability requirement are desired by all types of theory for secession. 
The fact that Remedial Right Only Theories demand an ascriptivist group in the form of a 
civic or an ethnic nation in effect makes this type of theory more stringent Ascriptivist 
Theories. However, the objections to Primary Right Theories forwarded by proponents of 
Remedial Right Only Theories are not rooted in morality but rather practicality and 
theoretical ambiguity which have been shown to be refuted or circumvented. A plausible 
theoretical approach to the issue of secession should therefore be based on the ascriptivist 
type of the Primary Rights Theory. 
                                                          
9
 Whether this is desirable or not is part of a different discussion. The point here is that it halts the flow and 
exchange of ideas by creating ideological monotonous political arenas. 
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